

NATIONAL PLAN  
OIL SPILL RESPONSE TRAINING

# EXERCISE 2000



The Dampier Archipelago

## PILBARA REGION

4th & 5th September 2000

NATIONAL PLAN TO COMBAT POLLUTION OF THE SEA BY OIL AND  
OTHER NOXIOUS AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES

**POST EXERCISE REPORT**

## Foreword

Exercise 2000 Was the fourth bi-annual oil spill response exercise conducted under the auspices of Australia's National Plan To Combat Pollution Of The Sea By Oil And Other Noxious And Hazardous Substances (National Plan). Previous exercises were conducted in Gladstone, Queensland in May 1994, Melbourne, Victoria in June 1996 and Port Adelaide, South Australia in June 1998.

Exercise 2000 was designed as a two-day event to test the responding agencies abilities to plan for a lengthy response involving equipment requirements and personnel planning. It was also planned to limit the responders to the use of Western Australian resources only for the first thirty six to forty eight hours of the spill as would be the case in an event of the magnitude depicted in the scenario.

Exercise 2000 was the first National Plan exercise under the Oil Spill Response Incident Control System (OSRICS) of the National Plan and reflected in the Western Australian Marine Oil Pollution Emergency Management Plan (WestPlan-MOP), the Dampier Port Authority Marine Oil Pollution Management Plan (DamPlan-MOP) and the Dampier Port Authority Marine Oil Pollution Contingency Plan (DamCon-MOP)

This exercise again proved that beneficial outcomes result from teamwork both within and external to the responding organisation. Although some deficiencies in plans were discovered the responding organisations in both internal and external debriefing sessions have recognised where improvement can be made and are taking action to implement the required changes. The assistance of The Australian Hydrographic Office by providing material to develop the scenario is gratefully acknowledged.

Prior to the release of the report the Western Australian authorities were invited to submit comments, most of which are included in this report.

Greg Beck  
Chair  
Exercise 2000 Steering Committee  
Australian Maritime Safety Authority

Jim Robinson  
Vice Chair  
Exercise 2000 Steering Committee  
Port Kembla Port Corporation

## Reporter's Note

Kerry Dwyer and Associates were engaged by the Exercise Planning Team to attend Exercise 2000 and consolidate this report from comments by umpires and participants.

This report includes comment designed to achieve constructive and positive outcomes. Where such comment is critical of the response to the scenario it is not intended to be either an organisational or personal comment. "Exercise 2000" was not a test of individuals it was designed to test systems to enable the 'National Plan' (including all its participating agencies) to better cope with such a threat wherever it occurs in Australia.

This report represents the experiences and opinions of those participants who chose to contribute and the umpires and observers who were appointed to the task. The report does not represent the views or opinions of the reporter.

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EXERCISE 2000 achieved its primary objective of testing National Plan arrangements by providing Government, port and industry personnel the opportunity to respond to a hypothetical spill of oil into the marine environment in the Port of Dampier, Western Australia thereby testing local plans and procedures. There were many factors which contributed to the success of the exercise, including:

## Exercise Value

This was the first national exercise conducted under OSRICS (Oil Spill Response Incident Control System) and thus provided the first opportunity to test the new spill response management structure. Participants from the Port of Dampier the Robe River Maritime Export Facility and other agencies were also able to test their local contingency plans under the umbrella of the Westplan and National Plan. All other Ports in the State participated to the extent of ascertaining the availability of equipment and personnel, together with estimated times for possible transfer to Dampier.

There were many aspects of the response to the scenario that were commented upon most constructively by umpires and at the exercise debrief. Response to actual spills in Australia will be improved through the experience gained in responding to the exercise scenario, both from the participants and the umpires/observers.

This exercise was not and never intended to be a test of individuals. This was a training exercise to test operational plans and procedures and coordination between agencies. The exercise did highlight the value of checklists, early surveillance of the scope of the problem and early requests for assistance.

## Exercise Planning and Scenario

The exercise control team comprised of experienced Australian oil spill responders. The team developed a total package entitled the "Exercise Instructions for Participants" providing comprehensive instructions to the vast range of participants involved.

The scenario was realistic to the extent of being based on a composite of incidents that have actually occurred in Australian waters. It allowed reasonable scope to approach the response in a number of ways and provided opportunities to explore all the relationships and outcomes required for successful combat of marine pollution.

## Exercise Control

The exercise control team was located in Karratha in the excellent SES Headquarters for the area. The location was sufficiently separated from the port but close enough to allow team members, umpires and observers to commute readily as required

## Exercise Evaluation

Experienced umpires, and observers came from overseas and from each State and the Northern Territory. In particular the umpires on whose evaluation this report is based were some of the most experienced and capable spill responders in Australia and overseas.

## Issues and Recommendations

The following constructive observations are intended to guide necessary changes in plans and procedures. The exercise was not a test of individuals but rather of systems, plans and procedures.

It is hoped that the States / Northern Territory / AMSA / industry ensure that their respective oil spill contingency plans are subject to continuous improvement, thereby allowing all involved to constantly improve their response skills, procedures and arrangements. National Plan State Committees and other participating organisations are encouraged to note the outcomes of this exercise, review their contingency plans and incorporate amendments as necessary.

### **Issue 1 - Training Requirements, Surveillance and Use of Oil Spill Trajectory Modelling, Assessing the Pollutant, Use of Environmental Information and Setting Response Priorities, Use of Oil Spill Dispersants**

It is essential to observe the oil, note where it is going, how it is spreading, its speed of movement and what is likely to be impacted. Surveillance flights were not actioned early enough in the exercise.

From the time of commencement of the exercise until nightfall some three hours later there was no attempt made to conduct either surface or aerial surveillance of the spill scene. There was similarly no attempt made to take oil samples for dispersant capability nor any effort made to contain spilt oil in the vicinity of the vessel. Ports need to be made aware of simple field testing requirements so that the amenability of the spilt oil to dispersant can be ascertained. All National Plan training needs to ensure that the requirements for collection of samples and conducting simple "field tests" are met.

Response personnel took too long to request an Oil Spill Trajectory Model (OSTM) to support visual observation of the oil. It was about two hours after the incident began that a model run was requested from exercise control while staff tried to assess the exact amount of oil and oil types spilt. This is vital to any planning and timing of response options. It is not necessary to have an exact amount of oil to run OSTM, only an indication to facilitate a first run then update requests once better intelligence is available.

There was an apparent lack of understanding within the response organisation of oil types, properties and oil weathering and the use of information sources such as Automated Data Inquiry for Oil Spills (ADIOS) to guide response planners. Oil samples were requested too late to do field dispersant checks and graphical outputs from ADIOS had to be explained to the planning group. There was no background or explanation of the ADIOS system available in the Natplan, WestPlan checklists or local Port Plan.

The State Environment and Scientific Coordinator (ESC) advising the Executive Response Group (ERG) and the Incident Controller (IC) was unable to make a recommendation in respect of using dispersant due to lack of information, which should have been available to

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him. It would appear that the ESC was placed in the unenviable position of using the precautionary principle when had he been properly resourced he would have been able to make a firm decision on the merits. The role of the State ESC is defined under Section 4.8.1 of the WestPlan-MOP.

Sound environmental resource information was unavailable to the planning group and environmental personnel on site. Also there was limited understanding of the Western Australian Oil Spill Response Atlas and its use in the provision of environmental information. Some staff were referring to outdated charts from previous Port Plans in the absence of good maps/charts in the current plans. This limited the ability to assess environmental objectives and priorities for protection. There were differences with environmental assessment and priorities between Fremantle and Dampier. It would have been more appropriate for the Incident Controller to have local environmental knowledge available to him.

The Western Australian State Committee should encourage the use of the Oil Spill Response Atlas (OSRA) in developing local contingency plans. This would assist ports in the detailing the local environmental sensitivities, providing detailed maps for planning use and the development of pre-agreed protection/response priorities. As a minimum they should have access to hardcopy OSRA environmental and logistical maps on site even though the OSRA data for Dampier may not be as detailed as the Port's Environmental Management Plan.

The shoreline response suffered from the lack of a readily available plan and resource commitment. The DPA Marine Oil Pollution Contingency Plan at Section 6 illustrates shoreline response strategies available to responders with a table detailing the application of shoreline cleanup methods to various shoreline types. The port requires predetermined strategies for each named area of coastline with optimum cleanup methods for each type of shoreline.

The Incident Management Team did not instigate a communications plan for Day 1. On Day 2 a detailed communications plan was developed and broadcast to all participants.

A physical communications plan was non-existent on Day 1 making any ship to shore, shore to shore, ship to ship, ship to air, shore to air communications difficult. On Day 2 a detailed and robust communications plan was developed and broadcast to all participants. There was a problem in securing spare UHF and VHF working channels. Once this was achieved and implemented the plan worked well.

## **Recommendation 1**

- (i) The WA State ESC organisation should be aware of recent advances in the theory and practice of dispersant use and if additional resource is required to achieve this level of awareness, it should be provided.**
- (ii) Use be made of trajectory modelling as a response aid. Western Australian plans should include a requirement to obtain regular and systematic aerial surveillance during oil spill incidents.**

**(cont)**

- (iii) Training be provided under National Plan on the use of the ADIOS oil weathering software and its importance in determining the use of various response options.**
- (iv) The State ESC be resourced to undertake the necessary briefing, familiarisation and consultation with other Federal / State / Territory environmental and scientific coordinators**
- (v) The Oil Spill Response Atlas (OSRA) be made freely available to potential oil spill response users in the State. As a minimum they should have access to hardcopy OSRA environmental and logistical maps on site.**
- (vi) National Plan oil spill response training should include information on how to conduct simple in-situ dispersant capability tests to allow the Incident Management Team to facilitate response planning**
- (vii) Ports should predetermine strategies for each area of coastline including optimum cleanup methods for each type of shoreline.**
- (viii) Pre-designated communications working channels/frequencies should be included in port oil spill contingency plans.**

## **Issue 2 - Incident Control System (ICS) Structure Personnel**

The Dampier Contingency Plan provides a checklist, which is available to the Incident Controller (IC) detailing immediate action required on advice of a spill. It is intended that such action be undertaken whilst others set up the Incident Control Centre (ICC) and other elements of the Incident Management Team (IMT). This would enable the Deputy Harbour Master as IC to deal exclusively with the operational component of the spill response.

The availability of key personnel within the ICS structure is vital to the success of any response. Some redundancy needs to be built in and high level commitment from parent organisations and/or the development of a higher level of commitment for mutual aid between industry representatives in Dampier for the provision of personnel is required. This redundancy needs also to take into account Dampier local working arrangements such as rostered days off etc.

There is also a need for identification and resourcing of support personnel available during an incident response, in particular personnel required for the Planning and Logistics sections and for on water deployment of equipment. This issue should be addressed as a matter of priority. Clearly the issue of ensuring the availability of adequately trained personnel from industry and local resources must be pursued.

### **Recommendation 2**

- (i) With regard to oil spill response management the roles of the Executive Manager and that of the Deputy Harbour Master outlined in the Dampier Port Contingency Plan should be reviewed..**

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- (ii) A consultation process should be instigated between the Dampier Port Authority (DPA), port industry and the general community to obtain a commitment from representative bodies with suitably qualified staff and community members to train as key personnel for incident response**

### **Issue 3 - Occupational Health & Safety (OH&S) Plan, Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) Usage**

Westplan Appendix J provides detailed guidelines for use by authorities such as Dampier Port Authority (DPA) in the development of Occupational Health and Safety sub plans. This could have been used as a basis for a simple plan setting out the minimum requirements for oil spill response situations. The plan should further outline the basic methods and steps to be applied during any Oil Spill and include responsibilities for actioning OH&S requirements. As part of an OH&S Plan, time must be put aside when personnel are assigned to tasks and equipment to be able to review the checklists and fully familiarise themselves with the OH&S requirements.

PPE compliance varied amongst individuals. Even though PPE was available there was a shortage of life jackets and as the day progressed life jacket usage started to decrease. Where used, self-inflating lifejackets were of great benefit in relation to safe working and personal manoeuvrability while operating and using equipment aboard vessels, Standard Personal Flotation Devices Type 1 (PFD1) were less suitable.

### **Recommendation 3**

- (i) The Dampier Port Authority should utilise Westplan Appendix J to develop a OH&S Plan based on the local situation. This plan should include external personnel to provide assistance in oil spill management. The plan should ensure that persons responsible for equipment deployment are fully familiar with the checklists and hazard assessments so they can brief crews on OH&S requirements**
- (ii) National Plan agencies review as necessary existing OH&S plans paying particular attention to induction and briefing requirements**

### **Issue 4 - Heritage and Cultural Issues**

When planning and exercising response operations, there needs to be an awareness about access to land possibly containing sacred and or culturally significant sites.

In accordance with common national practice there are no written records of such sites and the appropriate State Government agency will facilitate the contact and obtain the information for the Incident Management Team Incident Controllers/Exercise Planners and their teams. Indigenous heritage and cultural issues are not presently addressed in sufficient detail in either the National Plan, Westplan or Dampier Port Contingency Plan

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## **Recommendation 4**

***All contingency plans should provide procedures and the necessary State Government contacts for dealing with heritage and cultural matters when responding to pollution incidents. These guidelines would also be applicable to the conduct of all National Plan training and related activities.***

## **Issue 5 - Incident Control System (OSRICS) Forms and Logging of Information**

It was apparent to all umpires that too much time was being spent completing forms and too little time assessing/interpreting the response intelligence and information.

The Dampier Logistics section used a stateboard to convey information on the status of all resources available, requested and deployed, running a risk of failing to properly record equipment acquisition and expenditure. The finance section generated a large amount of paperwork during the operation using the forms provided by the Westplan system. However, the number of different forms in use seemed excessive.

Chronological logging of all documentation would provide a centrally available record of requests, decisions and status of the response. This would be a valuable resource for self briefing for response personnel during change of shift etc and would provide a centrally available record of requests, decisions and status of the response.

## **Recommendation 5**

- (i) Western Australia should continue to exercise and evaluate its documentation system and where necessary rationalise, amend and improve it.***
- (ii) National Plan participants review logging procedures and adopt as necessary chronological logging for all documentation***

## **Issue 6 - Legislative Reporting Requirements and Passing of Information to State/NT Interests**

Under current legislation the Dampier Port Authority has no legislative obligation to report a collision to Western Australia Transport. A five tonne spill is within the capacity of the port Authority and although there is a strong possibility Transport would have been notified there is no existing requirement to do so immediately.

During the exercise there was a distinct lack of information flow from the Incident Control Centre to the Executive Response Group (ERG) located at Fremantle. This had the effect of  
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inhibiting the ERG from passing information to political and other State interests. In addition lack of information inhibited the level of support that could have been provided from State level.

## **Recommendation 6**

- (i) The legislation governing ports be reviewed to require reporting of marine casualties.**
- (ii) Organisations performing the role of combat/lead agencies be aware of the necessity to provide up to date information to supporting Commonwealth / State / industry organisations and investigate ways to best meet this requirement**

## **Issue 7 – Conduct of the Exercise**

During the evening of day one a two-hour halt to the exercise was called for by umpires monitoring activity in the control room. This was agreed to by exercise control at Karratha. This information was not passed to the Executive Response Group at Fremantle who were at the time unable to account for a loss of communications with Dampier.

There were occasions during the exercise where it was necessary for umpires to perform additional functions such as they would normally undertake during an actual incident. This resulted in some confusion to a number of exercise participants.

There was comment as to the merits of pre positioning response teams at the location prior to commencement of the exercise. Western Australian Transport are of the view that pre-positioning of personnel should have been implemented.

## **Recommendation 7**

- (i) Planners for future exercises should ensure that all “Exercise Control” instructions are passed to key elements involved in the exercise.**
- (ii) Should there be a requirement for umpires and observers to play a dual role to maintain realism in future exercises the instructions given to them must be such as to not cause confusion to exercise participants.**
- (iii) When planning future exercises, exercise planners are to carefully assess the benefits of pre deployment or otherwise of personnel prior to commencement of the exercise.**

## **Issue 8 – Media Liaison**

Media liaison personnel perform a critical role in an oil spill response. Ideally they should anticipate and identify questions of concern that could be asked by the general media and deal immediately with those questions. This would assist the response management to concentrate on operational requirements. They should also alert response management as to additional media questions that management may have to address.

### ***Recommendation 8***

***Persons who may be required to perform the media liaison role undertake necessary training to provide a basic knowledge of current oil spill response operational requirements and strategies.***

# 1. Introduction

The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA), Dampier Port Authority (DPA), the Western Australian Department of Transport (WADOT), the petroleum and other industries together with other National Plan agencies conducted "Exercise 2000" in Dampier on 4th and 5th September 2000. It was a combined desktop and deployment exercise with a thorough debriefing over three hours on 6th September 2000 in Dampier.

## 1.1 Exercise Planning

Exercise 2000 Planning Team consisted of:

Greg Beck (Chair), Operations and Training Coordinator, Environment Protection Group  
AMSA Canberra, ACT

Jim Robinson (Deputy Chair), Operations Superintendent, Port Kembla Port Corporation  
Port Kembla, NSW

Captain Walter Stuart, State Chair / State Marine Pollution Controller, Department of  
Transport, Port Adelaide, SA

Brian Taylor, Senior Maritime Officer, Maritime Division, Queensland Transport, Brisbane,  
Qld

Ian Badham, State Environmental Support Coordinator, Queensland Environmental  
Protection Agency, Brisbane, Qld

Tom Budd, Technical Officer Engineering, Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre (AMOSC)  
Geelong, Vic

Captain Wynne Jones, Port Operations Superintendent, Mermaid Sound Port & Marine  
Services Pty Ltd, Perth, Western Australia

## 1.2 Aims and Objectives

### 1.2.1 Aims

- To exercise and test local site specific oil spill contingency plans, in particular the Port of Dampier, the Western Australian State and other relevant petroleum industry plans.

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## 1.2.2 Objectives

- To assess the role of the Western Australian Executive Response Group
- To test State response arrangements and command/control of an incident at a remote location
- To test response agency's awareness of their roles and responsibilities
- To test information, operational resource management and equipment deployment
- To test lines of communication between Government and Industry response authorities
- To assess the Oil Spill Response Incident Control System (OSRICS) as an oil spill response management structure
- To exercise key Government and industry response personnel

## 1.2.3 Exercise Assessment

As reported below the relevant plans and personnel were exercised, roles and systems assessed and responsiveness as detailed were tested. In particular the Oil Spill Response Incident Control System (OSRICS) on which the relevant plans were based proved to be a satisfactory response system.

## 1.3 Scenario

The scenario developed by the exercise steering committee to achieve the identified aims and objectives was that of a motor vessel ("Kas Kong Spirit") colliding with a tanker ("el Zeit") in Dampier port limits. The scenario represented a compilation of actual events experienced by members of the exercise committee and was designed to introduce oil types other than diesel and bunker fuel to enable responders to benefit more fully from the exercise.

After a reported initial loss of 5 tonnes of cargo, a total of approximately 800 tonnes of two distinct types of cargo was to escape from the tanker during the duration of the exercise. Exercise planning staff had arranged for a staged escalation of loss that can and does occur in genuine incidents.

While the scenario met the aim of testing the on scene response organisation, some participants felt that it failed to meet the objective of fully exercising the WA State Committee. It has been suggested that for further National Plan exercises it would be worth considering injecting a safe haven or other Government/Ministerial issues to ensure high level executive management involvement.

## 1.4 Agencies Involved

A large group of agencies were involved in Exercise 2000 either as part of the Exercise Control team, or as Umpires, Observers, National Response Team members, Government and industry representatives in addition to those who had committed to take part in the local response team. A list of participating officials is attached at Appendix 2.

## 2. Incident Response

### Day 1

The notification of the incident (a collision between a tanker *El Zeit* and a general cargo vessel *Kas Kong Spirit*) occurred at 1500 on Monday 4 September with the pilot of the *El Zeit* advising Dampier Port Control. The Vessel Traffic System Officer (VTSO) at Port Control (PC) sought the relevant information from the pilot; including, extent of damage, assistance required, tank soundings conducted and the vessel's intentions. The VTSO provided the right prompts to gather the pertinent details. The VTSO conveyed the information accurately and succinctly to the Incident Controller (IC). Further information was sought from the vessel such as type and quantity of oil onboard, rate of discharge, on direction from the IC. The IC exercised sound judgement, logic and reason in attempting to get a clear picture of the nature and severity of the incident.

At approximately 1520 the incident assessment and planning commenced between Media Liaison Officer (MLO) and Incident Controller (IC). Given the nature of the incident (collision with a tanker) and the initial report of 5t of oil having discharged with further discharge likely, the extent and severity of the incident was under-estimated. The situational awareness of the Incident Management Team (IMT) to the incident was conservative, resulting in a lack of urgency to identify and muster appropriate resources early.

The Securite message broadcast by PC to alert all ships and other port users of the incident and the requirement to keep clear was effective and worthwhile.

At approximately 1530 detailed planning was conducted between the IMT with calculations about the discharge rate (assessed at 20t/hour), tidal direction, and immediate actions required prior to sunset that evening. The discharge rate should have immediately signalled the need for additional resources from intrastate and possibly interstate through the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) and the Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre (AMOSC). There was a delay in invoking the Dampier contingency plan, notifying the Dampier Incident Control Centre (ICC) Section heads and the Department of Transport, thereby activating the Western Australian State Committee and Executive Response Group.

A need was assessed for relocating the vessel outside the channel given the commercial implications of a blocked channel. Regular feedback and information was sought and provided back from the casualty to PC on request of the IC. The information flow was good but there was an initial lack of action on the information being provided.

It was not until 1548 that officers from Western Australian Transport were notified of the incident. Given the potential severity of the incident and this was an exercise involving resources from within the State and interstate a number of umpires considered this delay excessive. Conversely, Western Australian Transport are of the view that this delay is acceptable given the number of issues which would need addressing had the scenario been an actual incident.

The recently revised Dampier plans identify a range of key and other personnel and agencies that will come in to support the DPA in the event of a major incident. It was disappointing to responders to not be provided with this support when needed. On day one there was no Logistics Officer to fill this role in the Oil Spill Response Incident Control System (OSRICS) structure. The Logistics Officer fills a key position and it is essential that the person identified be available when required.

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The Operations Officer is another key person. The recently revised plans identify that this person will come from outside Dampier. It is vital that a local person be identified to fill this position, even if only on a temporary basis pending the arrival of more experienced personnel from elsewhere. In Exercise 2000 an employee from the Dampier Port Authority filled the position on an interim basis. It should be noted that the work performed by this employee, who would not normally be called upon to undertake this level of support, was done in a competent manner pending the arrival of another person from Fremantle.

The issue of support personnel is one that should be addressed as a matter of priority. Clearly the issue of ensuring the availability of the adequate trained personnel from industry and local resources must be pursued.

The initial planning meeting of the IMT was conducted at 1552 and the ICC was activated. Plans were made for the activation of the four sections under OSRICS, Planning, Operations, Logistics and Finance and Administration. Two Section heads (Operations and Logistics) were not available.

The planning team worked on preparing plans to facilitate deployment of equipment to contain the oil within the confines of the vessel before sunset on Day 1. Through lack of personnel resources available containment close to the source of the spill did not occur and an opportunity to limit the spread of the oil was lost.

There was a lack of urgency in the response early on Day 1. The full range of response options that may be available to the responder were not addressed early enough. The issue of dispersant usage was not raised sufficiently early (although there was ongoing debate among Dampier planning personnel concerning the adequacy of advice being received on this matter from Fremantle).

The MLO decided not to initiate any media involvement on Day 1. This action is considered to be questionable as an incident like this was clearly going to continue over night and media relations should have been proactively managed early in the response.

More detailed planning was conducted throughout the afternoon including the quantity and disposition of oil onboard, likely weather forecast, trajectory modelling and fate and effects of oil. Good information exchange was conducted with the casualty. The stateboards in the ICC were logical and conveyed the overarching response plan under the headings of Objectives, Strategies and Achievements. At times there was confusion as to what was an objective and what was a strategy. This was resolved following intervention and guidance by an umpire. From this point clearly articulated objectives and strategies were developed.

At 1620 approx the IC provided a Sitrep to the Executive Response Group in Fremantle.

At 1627 the casualty advised a loss of 300tonnes and anchored in a new position outside the channel. Given the quantity and type (Light Arabian Crude with A960) of oil discharged, consideration should have been given to the immediate application of dispersant following a dispersability test of the "cocktail" of oil.

At 1630 the IC gave a full briefing to the IMT. The briefings were informative and well conducted with the IC showing good leadership, direction and delegating and prioritising tasks well. Objectives and strategies were well founded and articulated. In an attempt to keep the Fremantle component in the loop and save duplication it may have been worthwhile to have key responders from Fremantle hooked up to these meetings via a teleconference.

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Additional resources including State and National Response Team (NRT) were sought at 1640.

Arrangements were made for the deployment by on water personnel of the NOFI rapid deployment boom on the first evening but suitable personnel resources could not be sourced and deployed. A tug and tug's crew were resourced but a boom deployment team was unavailable. Eventually it was decided not to boom overnight due to safety reasons (there was ship movement scheduled at 0200). It was subsequently decided to plan for a boom deployment for containment in the early morning of Day 2 and the remainder of the night was spent in planning and securing enough resources for Day 2. There was also a lack of suitable Personal Protection Equipment kit for personnel involved in on-water operations.

No consideration was given to arranging another vessel/barge/tanker to transfer the remaining oil onboard, given that there was some 13,000 tonnes in damaged tanks No. 5 and No. 6.

SITREP 1 was despatched at 1700 and the information contained was accurate and informative. SITREP 2 was sent at 1850 and once again provided a good summary of the status of the incident.

Towards completion of Day 1 a break was called by two of the umpires to focus participants on measures required to respond effectively to the scenario. The difficulty of converting plans to response actions on water was acknowledged. Indeed the team were a little despondent as they realised that they had been slow in responding to the scenario.

Issues discussed at this meeting identified the problems and shortcomings of the day which included; lack of physical resources, key positions being vacant and moves to rectify this matter, the need for assessing the dispersant application option, the need for assessing a transfer option, the need for a press conference, the need to get additional resources on the ground, security, the lack of aerial observations to ground truth the trajectory model, the need for air and sea exclusion zones to control the incident site better and the need to have the downstairs state boards reflect the situation at hand.

Notice of a two hour stand down called during day one was not passed to the Executive Response Group Co-ordinator in Fremantle and were unaware that a break in the exercise had been called and were unable to account for the resultant loss of communications with Dampier. On occasions there may be a need to temporarily call a halt to an exercise to focus participants as to addressing the requirements called for in the scenario. There was positive comment made by participants on the initiative taken by two umpires in calling a stand down. If this had not happened there would have been a strong possibility that the exercise would have deteriorated.

Advice of a stand down was not passed to the ERG at Fremantle. When a stand down occurs the Exercise Planning Team needs to ensure that key exercise instructions are passed to all key participants. Planners for future exercises should ensure that all "Exercise Control" instructions are passed to key elements involved in the exercise.

Certain exercise participants were confused by the multiple roles adopted by a number of umpires. Some filled the role of umpire and but on occasions retained core function responsibilities normally exercised from interstate. This was exacerbated by the exercise instruction that all external operational communications would be made direct to the Exercise Planning team located in the Karratha SES Centre.

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Should there be a requirement for umpires and observers to play a dual role to maintain realism in future exercises the instructions given to them must be such as to not cause confusion to exercise participants.

## **Day 2:**

Day 2 commenced at approximately 0500 with all key section heads present, and a distinct air of enthusiasm and confidence, particularly following the lack of success on Day 1. This was a credit to the IMT who once again demonstrated good leadership.

The ICS structure was clearly articulated on stateboards with all participants having a mutual understanding of other's responsibilities and what the plan was. There was very good communication, both up and down from the four section heads. ie up to IMT and down to own section staff. A clear, precise and well-understood plan had emerged with a clear focus to move forward.

The IMT had developed key Objectives, Strategies, and Achievements, which were listed on the stateboard. In order the objectives were;

- Protect environment and industry,
- Reduce financial exposure,
- Manage external affairs (media),
- Conduct safe operations,
- Implement effective communications.

The incident response progressed well throughout the day and there was a strong spirit of co-operation and intent to do well. On reflection during day 2 there were a number of issues requiring attention from commencement of the exercise;

- The delay in testing and utilising dispersant,
- The distinct lack of personnel to man and deploy equipment,
- The lack of aerial and surface surveillance to ground truth the oil spill trajectory model,
- The over reliance on the use of the correct form (of which there are a large number) which at times inhibited or delayed actions

## **Summary**

Day 1 was slow with a general lack of urgency and realism. Day 2 was a marked improvement on Day 1 with the incident response being well organised, purposeful and focused on the mitigation and clean up of the oil spill.

### **3. Western Australia State Committee and Executive Response Group**

The following observations are based on debrief comments and written reports from exercise umpires and key participants.

#### **Initial Response at Fremantle**

Umpires expressed concern at the delay in notice of the incident being reported. In light of the nature of the incident (collision resulting in a report of a spill) it was anticipated that responders on site would have anticipated either a deterioration or at least suspected the accuracy of the ship's first report and alerted the wider Western Australia National Plan network. The issue has been raised that the Dampier Port Authority has no legislative requirement to report the collision to Western Australia Transport (under current legislation). A five tonne spill is within the capability of the Port Authority and although in reality Transport would have been notified there is no existing requirement from the port authority to do so immediately.

Induction to the incident centre was thorough with visitors given a detailed familiarisation course (amenities, emergency protocols etc). While this was occurring, the office staff were calmly converting the office to a response centre identifying space allocation for functional activity, providing additional power and data capability and donning tabards.

Umpires were impressed with the calmness of the activity and the clear understanding of their responsibilities and roles of all participants. There was little initial discussion or allocation of tasks and this allowed all participants to get themselves organised and ready to operate once the first briefing was provided.

#### **Management**

Management in Fremantle was conducted in an authoritative way and demonstrably in line with the Western Australian Plan

There was no apparent need for significant allocation of tasks or for any specific supervision of staff in the response activity. The team was well structured, alert, cooperative with other members, had clear understanding of their respective roles and how the whole mechanism fitted together. The Fremantle office functioned very smoothly.

AMSA was promptly alerted by the ERG Co-ordinator that the National Plan was operational in this "incident" and met the requirement of the exemption from application of Part 3 of the Environment Protection Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999.

At the time that the incident moved from 300 to 800 tonnes of oil, the management team immediately discussed the need for upgrading to an upper tier 2 / tier 3 response and the West Australian State Marine Pollution Controller (SMPC) took over management of the response in Fremantle. This was done in consultation with the State Chair who alerted the State Committee by facsimile and telephone.

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The State Committee was not convened and it would have been useful for formal information to have been passed to them regularly.

There was good communication with political and State departmental interests. The Chair of the State Committee was in attendance for the entire exercise and this facilitated prompt decision-making and quick responses to media requirements.

During the response it became clear to those in Fremantle that all was not going as well as should be expected (at the hot debrief this was identified as the day one problem). State Committee and ERG Management in Fremantle were aware of this and were working towards a possible solution when "time out" (end of day one) was called and functions at the Fremantle office were suspended until the next day.

## **Planning**

The Fremantle Planning Team also demonstrated calm and initiative in performing their tasks. They impressed in the way in which they solved the mystery of the A960 oil cargo. They used their industry network and confirmed information received from several sources. This team also provided concise accurate and effective handovers at each shift handover (4 hourly).

## **Media**

Media team comments are at Section 4.7.

## **Scientific and Environmental**

The State ESC appeared to be under-resourced and seemed to have trouble with communications with the Dampier Incident Control Centre. There appeared to be some serious differences between Dampier and Fremantle on the question of the use of dispersants - the advice offered by the State ESC in Fremantle until close of business on day 1 was that dispersants would not be contemplated. In the view of umpires, this was an overly conservative position.

There is a need for the Executive Response Group's input on environmental support to be more proactive. The exercise demonstrated a clear need for consultation with the Incident Management Team's Planning Section.

There seemed to be an unacceptably long delay in the decision to use or not to use dispersants and testing of the oil for amenability to dispersion. This activity should have been underway very early in the incident. Further dispersability testing could have been undertaken overnight. Waiting until day 2 ran the risk of losing the window of opportunity and more oil going ashore in critical areas

## Administration

The administration team performed well and were familiar with their tasks. Information management, control systems and financial management systems were effective and briefings were provided as required.

The State Plan including check lists were widely followed and provided a useful way of ensuring all steps that were necessary were undertaken. Information was well handled with a good logging and recording system implemented.

Frequent briefings (approx every 2 hours) kept everyone up to date and served to clarify focus and decide some management issues.

Consideration could be given to instituting a "chronological" logging of all documentation, which would provide a centrally available record of requests, decisions and status of the response. This would provide a valuable resource for self-briefing of shift change personnel and also reduce current post incident administrative load. It is also suggested that the current practice of collecting this information in subject matter order (i.e. all Sitreps, logistics, planning etc information) be held in that way post event. This would allow for easier cross checking and reference in costing and reporting, investigation activity post event.

It would appear that the Western Australian Plan is generally understood by the Western Australian authorities and would be effectively implemented by the Executive Response Group and State Committee dimension in a major incident.

The greatest problem experienced in Fremantle was obtaining accurate and up to date information about what was happening. The Western Australian State Marine Pollution Controller (after being appointed) and the State Chair did not feel that they had at any time sufficient information to comprehensively brief the Minister or indeed face the media with confidence. This from the Fremantle end was a significant shortcoming of the response and ports must be made aware that there are needs and expectations other than local ones.

## 4. Incident Management Team (Dampier)

### 4.1 Incident Control

From the time of commencement of the exercise until nightfall some three hours later there was no attempt made to conduct either surface or aerial surveillance of the spill scene. There was similarly no attempt made to take oil samples for dispersant capability nor any effort made to contain spilt oil in the vicinity of the vessel.

To address response requirements in general the Dampier Contingency Plan does provide a checklist, which is available to the Incident Controller detailing immediate action required on advice of a spill. It is intended that such action be undertaken whilst others set up the Incident Control Centre (ICC) and other elements of the Incident Management Team (IMT). This would enable the Deputy Harbour Master the nominated Incident Controller, to deal exclusively with the operational component of the spill response. These activities should be amongst the first actions to be considered to gain accurate knowledge of the size of the spill and to prepare for the best methods to combat the spill whilst still afloat and possibly capable of dispersion.

The initial response required rather more urgency and direction. A misunderstanding with the administration staff resulted in people required for the response being put on standby rather than called in. Possibly the activity of trying to set up the management structure for the exercise rather than trying to undertake an emergency response to the environmental threat the scenario posed may have delayed the response. The organisation should allow for both of these functions to proceed concurrently

Whilst the scenario initially involved less than 10 tonnes, the port should have been running an emergency response team. Due to limited staff numbers this would mean that all personnel would initially be required. The duty Port Controller and one administrative staff member could have been left to call out personnel as required. The team was handicapped by the lack of the nominated personnel from local industry to assist as planned.

There was concern with the inordinate length of time taken to deploy booms. The issues revolve around the lack of personnel available from local industry on that day to do the physical work.

### 4.2 Incident Safety

The Safety Officer reported a number of concerns both administratively and operationally.

OH&S provisions by DPA for the plan were generally good despite the lack of a formal written OH&S plan. Team Leaders emphasised OH&S frequently in briefings with personnel involved in the exercise however there was a lack of consistency depending upon time pressures and tasks at hand.

Westplan Appendix J contains guidance available for use by authorities such as DPA and this could have been used as a basis for a simple plan setting out the minimum requirements for Oil Spill Response situations. This lack of a plan to check or action items against was observed when the OH&S requirements were forgotten or by-passed during some of the off

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shore activities. The plan would not need to be a detailed document, only several pages outlining the basic methods and steps to be applied during any Oil Spill and responsibilities for actioning OH&S requirements.

Checklists outlining the OH&S requirements for the equipment used during the exercise had been prepared in advance, were of good quality and contained excellent information. There was unfortunately insufficient time made available for exercise personnel to review these checklists. As part of an OH&S Plan, time must be put aside when personnel are assigned to tasks and equipment to be able to review the checklists and fully familiarise themselves with the OH&S requirements.

During the initial mobilisation of personnel to the jetty before placing equipment into the water, a very good induction was held outlining key OH&S points for the new personnel despite the lack of a comprehensive OH&S plan. After this however, follow on inductions/OH&S instructions for individual tasks and equipment varied depending upon personnel involved and time constraints.

Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) compliance varied amongst individuals - the possible reason for this is the difficulty in "seeing the oil" and being able to relate potential contamination and health effects with "clean Water". PPE was available however there was a shortage of life jackets and as the day wore on life jacket usage started to decrease.

It is recommended that some form of consolidated induction be conducted by DPA personnel for all likely sites to be accessed in the port area. Cooperation by lease/land holders in the port in respect of induction would be most effective in saving valuable time for spill responders.

The DPA has been informed of several areas of work practice, equipment deficiency and personal protection for attention, which should lead to improved safety in spill response in the port.

### 4.3 Planning Section

There appeared to be a lack of communication between the Environmental Unit Coordinator (EUC) on site and the State ESC at Fremantle, along with differing opinions on response actions and priorities; confusion developed between the two through poor identification of bays and headlands for protection.

The Oil Spill Response Atlas showing sensitive areas requiring protection needed to be available on site for ready use. In addition other Coastal Response Atlas' for the area could have been used, including the Port of Dampier Environmental Management Plan.

Far better use could have been made of airborne and seaborne intelligence to update and ground truth the situation on the ground. There was an over reliance on trajectory models and it must be remembered that these are an aid only.

Dispersant application was not progressed adequately and there clearly needs to be far better defined guidelines for EUCs for the application of dispersants. There was a delay in obtaining a sample for a dispersability test, the Light Arabian Crude was very suitable for dispersing. The decision to apply dispersant as a test run should have been initiated earlier, especially when the tests showed the two available dispersants, Slickgone and Ardrex, were suitable on the Light Arabian Crude and the Slickgone was suitable on the A960.

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In addition the WA ports do not have dispersant capability test kits and have had no training in their use. This situation should be rectified under the National Plan.

The main and most effective response tool available to responders in this exercise scenario was the use of oil spill dispersant by helicopter spray buckets. Historically most clean up costs and environmental damage occurs when foreshores are impact by oil spills.

The failure to employ dispersants on the first day of the exercise arose due to the lack of timely provision of advice on environmental priorities.

The preparation of Incident Action Plans was conducted through a rigorous and comprehensive process with all options being considered and defensible.

The priority areas for protection were sound and a balanced approach was taken when assessing industry, community and environmental issues. Priority areas included; power station intakes, mangroves in King Bay, Sea Ripple Passage, Flying Foam Passage, Holden Beach and Withnell Bay.

The Planning Section displayed flexibility and were prepared to adjust and fine tune priorities as the situation changed. There was lack of consideration given to local community, indigenous and heritage issues during the planning process.

The issue of waste disposal was well managed with the use of vacuum trucks sourced from local industrial providers.

The planning group worked hard during all stages of the exercise. The WestPlan Marine Oil Pollution & Dampier Port Authority Marine Oil Pollution Contingency Plan was used and the checklists used by the groups. The ICS system worked well (note general comments below) and pre-formed situation boards were well organised but not updated well until the second day. The planning group undertook excellent record keeping and wildlife response plans were developed and handled well. Oil and oiled waste management plans/options were developed and there was good interaction with operations group and the siting of both groups within one room helped in communication. Labelled tabards easily identified planning and operational personnel.

### **Access To and Use of Planning Information**

Planning personnel were spending valuable time trying to take OSTM slick location information and overlaying manually on a range of other maps/charts.

The NatPlan Oil Spill Response Atlas (OSRA) system allows this to be done in a user-friendly geographic format. Tools developed under the OSRA project allow this to be done automatically. It is recommended that OSRA be easily available to potential responders within the State.

State boards were well thought out and in most cases used although there was differing information between the ICS upstairs/downstairs situation boards at times.

## 4.4 Operations Section

The mobilisation of personnel from Fremantle/Perth appeared to take too long although in an actual incident a charter flight would have been arranged for those from Perth. In the event, the time of dispatch of the team was governed by the availability of commercial air flights and they departed Perth at 0600 on day 2 arriving in Karratha at about 0815. When the team arrived at DPA from Perth, they were advised to go back into Dampier and check in to their motel, which resulted in a further delay.

With the time the inductions took, the teams were not ready to operate the equipment until about 1100 or 1130 on Tuesday, or about 20 hours after the incident. Despite the delay the inductions and paperwork were effectively completed.

It has been recommended that for future National Plan exercises, particularly when they are to be held in remote ports, it may be more beneficial to pre-position the State response team so that they and the port gain the maximum training benefit for the expenditure involved. When planning future exercises, exercise planners are to carefully assess the benefits of pre deployment or otherwise of personnel prior to commencement of the exercise. This would apply in particular to exercises planned in remote areas.

The organisation of people on the ground initially lacked any real urgency, and had the pressures of the public and the media been seriously focussed on a real event, then the response management would have been roundly criticised.

It is recommended that the local response team be resourced and supplemented from within the region as required.

### 4.4.1 Marine Unit

Delay was experienced in deploying booms and connecting to the Marco self propelled skimmer. It would have been advantageous if the booms had been placed aboard the Marco and connected before passing the booms to the towing vessels.

The Canflex towable storage bladder that was to be used as stowage for the oil recovered by the Marco was reportedly taking water and therefore rendering the equipment inoperative. This deficiency may have been detected had routine checks of oil pollution gear been carried out.

Careful consideration of sites for induction briefings should be made to avoid distraction from noise from helicopters etc.

There was an apparent lack of communication between the personnel in the Control centre and on the jetty. This could have been minimised by face-to-face discussions between the groups to clarify several issues/disagreements about the plan that arose (again in a real life situation where oil is on the water this probably may have been minimised).

#### **4.4.2 Shoreline Unit**

The shoreline response suffered from the lack of a readily available plan and resource commitment. The DPA Marine Oil Pollution Contingency Plan at Section 6 illustrates shoreline response strategies available to responders with a table detailing the application of shoreline cleanup methods to various shoreline types. The port requires predetermined strategies for each named area of coastline with optimum cleanup methods for each type of shoreline.

The Westplan – Marine Oil Pollution Plan includes a thorough checklist to provide tools to assist in shoreline assessment and cleanup. Early establishment of the Shoreline Unit would have assisted.

The Shoreline Co-ordinator commenced activities early on Tuesday 5 September 2000. The Co-ordinator produced a plan for 1200 hours, and was developing a plan for 1600 hours and beyond. Key checklist functions were included in the plan. The availability of only one extra person from approximately 1100 hours inhibited the Shoreline response.

It is important to recognise at an early stage that the Shoreline Unit may ultimately employ the largest number of personnel over the longest period and therefore should be appropriately resourced with trained personnel who have the expertise to implement an effective Shoreline Response Plan.

#### **4.4.3 Wildlife Unit**

Overall, all participants felt they gained valuable experience from taking part in Exercise 2000. Department of Conservation and Land management (CALM) staff in Karratha and the CALM Wildlife Protection Branch contacted volunteers, simulated purchase and transport of equipment and organised to fly people to Karratha/Dampier to take part in the rescue and care of oiled wildlife. Volunteers, transport companies and airlines were all very cooperative. Communications between different areas within CALM worked well and information was received on a regular basis.

However, it was felt, particularly from a local point of view, that the exercise was somewhat superficial with respect to wildlife. Three oiled turtles were reported at approximately 1600 Monday and 20 oiled birds were reported at 0600 Tuesday, both outside the area where oil was on the surface of the Water. No more reports of oiled wildlife were received during the day, except one, which was later discounted (40-50 oiled dugong also outside the slick). It was felt that if 800T of oil were actually spilt, there would have been a larger number of oiled wildlife, despite the fact that the area in question is not of high importance for wildlife. It is likely that the oil would have affected larger numbers of birds and turtles.

Increased benefit was gained from the exercise by expanding the parameters with regard to oiled wildlife (it was presumed 200 birds being oiled, rather than 20). It was pleasing to note that following receipt of the report indicating 20 oiled birds the wildlife unit made a proactive assessment that it would be likely that 200 birds would be oiled.

Communication within the Incident Control Centre, particularly between Planning, the IC and Operations appeared to have some problems. Whilst Planning was producing a plan and then sending it to the IC for approval, many times the plan did not return to the Operations

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group to be enacted. It appeared that the IC, and the team upstairs at the Port Authority, Was enacting it, thus increasing their stress levels and leaving the Operations team somewhat in the dark as to what was actually happening.

In addition, some field teams were not briefed on the situation. The CALM vessel was involved with boom deployment but the personnel on board were not told what the scenario was, where the oil was or how the team was proposing to combat the situation. Neither were they offered any food during the day.

#### **4.4.4 OH&S**

##### **Day 1**

During the first day personnel were observed running up and down the stairs to the control room. The steps have no anti-slip protection on them and once personnel had oil on their footwear, the steps could have become dangerous. In the initial briefing on Day 2 specific instructions were given to team leaders to brief their personnel to not run up and down the stairs.

At around 1640 equipment was mobilised from the DPA storage shed. This was done by a single operator and communication was via radio. The control room had a telescope to keep an eye on him but with poor light in the evening the only method of communication was via radio. A system should be set up where regular radio calls are made to isolated workers to ensure they have not had an accident.

Poor light on the jetty in the evening made movement around the area slightly hazardous and lights were not turned on in the area until 1820. This should have been done earlier.

Equipment in the oil spill shed was well laid out, tagged to certify that it had recently inspected (July 2000 in most cases). Weight of equipment was clearly marked to aid in lifting and loading. One issue of concern was the storage of around 45 litres of flammable liquids next to combustible materials. A flammable storage container should be used to secure these liquids to prevent loss of equipment in a fire.

##### **Day 2**

The mobilisation of non-DPA personnel (CALM, Fisheries, FPA etc) at the jetty included an initial induction and OH&S discussion before operating equipment. This was well done and provision of PPE made. The only issue was a shortage of life jackets, which wasn't remedied until late in the day.

Personnel from a stevedoring company who were being used in a support capacity on the jetty were observed on several occasions to be without adequate PPE and operating unsafely. Some examples were operation of forklifts through personnel, climbing onto cranes to talk to the operator while lifts were in progress and not wearing seatbelts while operating forklifts. It would appear that contemporary safe working practices need to be addressed.

It was noted that some personnel were dressed in waders and some removed their shirts. This was quickly picked up as an unsafe act and corrected by DPA personnel. Although the planned changed to not require the shore party to be landed, there was no provision made for water and shade for them while on the beach - this is an important requirement,

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especially for personnel who had just arrived from a cooler climate.

Provision of water, sunscreen and sun protection was generally good however it must be clearly emphasised to all Team Leaders the need to take heat exhaustion into account for personnel flying into assist in oil spill responses, especially during winter conditions where high heat can affect personnel who are not acclimatised. This should form a specific provision in DPA's Oil Spill OH&S Plan. The crew on the jetty handled the treatment of the mock casualty on the Mermaid Boss very well, especially the first aid provided by WA Transport and FPA personnel and the responding St John's Ambulance crew. Throughout this exercise the utmost caution was used to minimise the risk of injury to responders and casualty.

Exclusion zones for "dirty" and "clean" areas were not set up - this should have been done to prevent contamination of the jetty area and introduction of additional hazards. In real life this would have been easy to see, however there was no attempt to set these up in the exercise.

#### **4.4.5 Waste Management Unit**

The issue of waste disposal was well managed with the use of vacuum trucks sourced from local industrial providers.

The Local Authority was independently queried on their ability to handle the particular waste and was quite confident that suitable arrangements were in hand despite an earlier indication that their sites were unsuitable. This may be an issue for DPA to follow up with the Local Authority.

### **4.5 Logistics Section**

The Logistics Section had an excellent rapport with local industry and they procured resources very well with the minimum of fuss. The group had a "can do" attitude and provided good estimates of costs on all equipment acquisitions, which was very helpful to the Finance and Admin Section in putting together a running total.

There was good interaction and communication between the Logistics Section and the Operations and Finance and Admin Sections. Communication up to IMT and down to section members was good and the information flow with all units was very encouraging.

The provision of medical resources was good with a doctor being placed on standby during Day 1 and St John ambulance staff on site during Day 2. All transport requirements, cranning, and staging sites were well organised

The section used a stateboard to convey information on the status of all resources available, requested and deployed. Whilst it is recognised that use of stateboards is a valuable tool for incident management their limitations for record keeping must be recognised. The Logistics section supplemented the recording requirement by keeping their own records as it was considered the range of forms provided for in Westplan were excessive.

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Umpires were of the opinion that:

- the range of forms provided by Westplan for recording purposes was excessive;
- they were being overused and had replaced oral requests; and
- they added to an already high workload.

However, of the forms provided, the majority are for use by other sections and only two are unique to the logistics section. The Westplan documentation system was under trial during Exercise 2000. It is plain that proper documentation is a necessity in all sections and that accordingly, all key response sections must become familiar with its use.

WA should continue to exercise and evaluate its documentation system and where necessary, amend and improve it.

A physical communications plan was non-existent on Day 1 making any ship to shore, shore to shore, ship to ship, ship to air, shore to air communications difficult. On Day 2 a detailed and robust communications plan was developed and broadcast to all participants. There was a problem in securing spare UHF and VHF working channels. Once this was achieved and implemented the plan worked well. Thought should be given to having pre-designated working channels for incident responses.

There was not a comprehensive listing of all personnel by name on site and this caused some problems with catering for lunch on Day 2. This needs to be rectified for safety reasons as well. The section had numerous difficulties in sourcing and securing sufficient local personnel for the response and eventually sourced personnel from emergency services. The provision of physical security for equipment was well done.

The termination phase of the incident was well managed by the Logistics Section with preparations made for the decontamination and return of personnel and equipment .

## 4.6 Finance and Administration Section

The performance of the ICC Manager in the initial phase of the response, which involved the key ports managers, was excellent. With the small number of staff in the port (10) the sharing of all the functions was undertaken smoothly and as the exercise progressed and information came to hand it was logged on the personal log pads and recorded clearly on the ICC Management Team room white board displays.

With the small number of staff in this phase there was room for the personnel to work in the confined area without too much difficulty. It is important to note that the choice of the ICC to be located in the Port of Dampier office is believed to be most appropriate. The expansion of temporary accommodation was possible in the car park and car port area for Media briefings, meal room, receipt of stores etc.

On Day 2 the ICC was operational at 0500 with the four sections in place and personnel settling in to perform the tasks as the information came to hand. The ICC Manager had the necessary white board displays in place and resource material to allow to functioning of the sections.

The finance and administration section leader was from Port Dampier, and the rest of the team were volunteers from the industry and the community who performed their tasks most enthusiastically. The diligence displayed by this section in managing the flow and receipt of documentation can only be described as faultless

The Finance & Administration officer with the cooperation of the Logistics team leader was able to keep a running tab on the expenditure committed to the spill. This information was conveyed to the Section Officer for inclusion in the Incident Management Team planning and briefing meetings.

Operational displays were readily available but the assignment of the task of plotter was not evident. Therefore there was a gap in recording and identifying what resources, personnel etc. that were assigned to the field, on standby or on order etc. This is a function of the ICC Manager to assign the tasks to the Centre staff.

## 4.7 Media

### 4.7.1 Marine House, Department of Transport, Fremantle

Responses to media requests were immediate and efficiently handled. This, together with regular news conferences staged every three hours each day ensured effective control of media issues arising throughout the scenario as it applied to Fremantle base.

Media Liaison personnel from Western Australian Department of Transport conducted their duties with diligence, enthusiasm and professionalism.

However, there are some observations, which may assist future planning for an oil spill response by media liaison personnel.

It was noted that there was a significant delay of approximately two hours on Day 1 of the Exercise between the Media Liaison Group (MLG)'s first notification of the incident and the release of a news statement to waiting media. A delay of this order would be deemed

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unacceptable by mainstream news media in an actual incident.

Exercise 2000 media questioning at news conferences called in Fremantle were allowed to run largely unchecked by attending MLG staff. There is a point in every news conference when Incident Control Centre public relations staff needs to step in call a halt to further interviews when the line of questioning ceases to be in the public interest. Failure to do so can create difficulties in the management of public issues associated with events of this nature.

#### **4.7.2 Reporting And Mobilisation**

Media Liaison staff within Department of Transport (DoT), Perth were notified of the incident at Dampier Port at 1610 on 4 September 2000. Media staff immediately informed DoT Director-General and the Minister. This is in accordance with standard operating procedures in an incident of this nature. It indicates the MLG had been primed and were well prepared.

A draft news release was prepared by MLG based on known information within minutes of notification. It was forwarded to the Executive Response Group, Fremantle (ERG) for checking and approval at 1624.

While awaiting necessary approvals MLG staff made preparations to move as soon as possible into ERG and to the scene of the incident at Dampier Port. It was recognised by MLG staff that day-to-day MLG operations had to continue in the absence of key staff and the arrangements made reflected that awareness. MLG staff arrived at ERG at 1800.

At this point arose one of the key learnings from Exercise 2000, from a Media Liaison perspective. Lack of clarity around information received from Dampier Port forced MLG to withdraw the draft news release while further information was sought. This resulted in unacceptable delays in approvals. The approval process involved the Minister's Office, the Director-General, DoT, ERG and Dampier Port.

As a consequence, an approved statement was not issued to all media until 1810, 4 September 2000, approximately two hours after MLG first became aware of the incident. In an actual incident, the media would have found the delay completely unacceptable. It is likely stories on the incident would have been run in the absence of any authoritative information. This speculative and inaccurate material could have led to serious difficulties for the Minister, DoT and MLG in effectively managing the incident from that time onward.

The MLG support staff initiated a call log immediately upon being notified of the incident. Every incoming and outgoing media call as recorded on pre-printed "Media Contact Forms". These were circulated to key personnel including the Director-General, DoT and the Minister. This system appears to have worked satisfactorily during the course of the Exercise.

All briefings called by State Marine Pollution Controller were attended by at least one of two media representatives from MLG.

The Media Liaison staff posed persistent questions at every briefing. In particular, considerable tenacity was displayed on several occasions in seeking to draw the attention of the Executive Response Group (ERG) Co-ordinator and others present to political and media implications of various courses of action. The leader mounted strong cases for greater emphasis to be given to such issues with warnings of public consequences if the news media chose to follow up the issue under discussion.

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Media Liaison personnel perform a critical role in an oil spill response. Ideally they should anticipate and identify questions of concern that could be asked by the general media and deal immediately with those questions thereby allowing response management to concentrate on operational requirements. They should also alert response management as to additional media questions they may have to address. It would be therefore be desirable that potential media liaison person(s) have a basic knowledge of current oil spill response operational requirements and strategies.

### **4.7.3 Planning**

The MLG staff operated throughout Exercise 2000 in accordance with the Western Australian Media Sub-Plan, periodically checking it to ensure consistency between the Sub-Plan and tasks carried out by MLG.

Single point contact was quickly established for all media inquiries with one spokesperson nominated to deal with all requests for background information of an operational nature. The WA State Chairman and the State Marine Pollution Controller (SMPC) headed up news conferences.

An MLG representative was active in each of the three main activity districts namely: Perth, Fremantle and Dampier Port. This ensured media communications were adequately and promptly dealt with. It also avoided a common mishap in incidents of this nature when various people make statements to the news media.

News conferences were scheduled every three hours in Dampier and every three hours in Fremantle.

A critical incident arose during the course of this planning when the MLG considered the possibility of over-riding the DPA when it was becoming obvious that local delays were threatening to undermine the effectiveness of the media response. MLG decided against this course of action after discussion with the ERG Coordinator. It illustrates the need for clearly defined protocols to be in place before an incident.

### **4.7.3 Ongoing Response**

Regular news conferences were scheduled at both Dampier Port and the Transport offices in Fremantle throughout the day. This resulted in up to date, blanket coverage of Exercise 2000 in the news media. The schedule satisfied most media demands for fact and data. It also ensured media would not be predisposed to seeking out comment from uninformed sources. In actual incidents news media have an insatiable appetite for information and will quickly fill gaps in their news services from other, often less reliable, sources.

All briefings called by the ERG Co-ordinator were attended by at least one MLG staff member.

#### **4.7.4 Dampier Port Authority Building**

From a media perspective Exercise 2000 was very well run, adequately meeting media needs for a fair size spill (800 tonnes).

The response met at least 80 percent of media contingencies in the new state Westplan-marine oil pollution guidelines but suggest some additional basic information be considered and added to this Plan by the ERG.

##### **Management**

The lines of communication cleared quickly with lead media agency handed to Dampier Port Authority within the first hour and backed up by resources from ERG Fremantle. DPA-CEO appointed a media spokesman (MLO), an accomplished media skills trained operator. Day one media request calls and direct interviews adequately handled. However, the very important basic facts media release with media contacts was promised but not received in Dampier until 1830, over three hours after exercise commencement. To take early pressure off response management and dispel flying rumours this release must be distributed nationally within the first hour if possible.

It was noted that at ERG Fremantle, while MLO was in place, took about three hours for two back-up media operatives to arrive from Perth. This included a briefing to enable them to respond to media call-backs.

Day 2 introduced a new back-up MLO overnight from Perth as the spill developed into a Tier 2/3 event. Some seven (7) media releases and three (3) media alerts to upcoming conferences were issued throughout the day from media operatives in both ICC's, this was considered creditable.

The information contained in these releases was factual, resourced and well constructed.

##### **Resources**

Adequate resources were introduced in the exercise period. It appeared that return calls on notice were dealt with to appropriate deadlines and an acceptable standard of reply. These media calls were generated from Karratha, Dampier and Canberra.

The use of assets to access vision and still pictures of the oil situation and response equipment by helicopter flyovers and surface craft was offered on a shared footage/film basis. This is crucial to media on-site and a means of authorities knowing where reporters are concentrated and issues flowing.

##### **Location**

The DPA building is very restricted in space and the muster areas for media and public was tight. This encroached on management and clean-up team operations. The use of the external carport (out of weather) to muster and hold conferences away from ICC operations should be considered.

##### **Security**

Security should have been provided at the front gate boom in addition to the front desk at the DPA. Visitors should have been issued instructions for parking access,

(cont)

signed in, and issued with name tags together with rigid enforcement of identity. ID and no-go signage should have been posted on all operation rooms including media muster and conference areas. Whiteboard outside operations building with AM/PM media instructions and available on-site contacts/waiting areas/conference and Q&A locations and times should also have been arranged.

### **Media Conferences**

Due to the lack of suitable media facilities at DPA the CEO's office was used on both days. The office was totally inadequate for this purpose. Media control protocols were lacking at all three media conferences allowing journalists to virtually run the agenda.

### **Community**

There appeared to be no pre-planning to advise the local community (Dampier and Karratha) on the issues at hand, how the spill would affect them and how they could possibly assist. Some form of initial advice and regular update through local media should have been addressed. This was well proven in the "Kirki" situation.

## 5. Heritage and Cultural Issues

The exercise scenario raised the issue of indigenous heritage/cultural values. In fact, in following the exercise situation, the ERG Coordinator encountered a real concern amongst local indigenous representatives that an exercise had been planned in the Dampier area without prior consultation.

It should be standard practice to consult State heritage personnel who have contacts with local indigenous groups who will advise which areas are to be avoided when planning shoreline cleanup and approach with heavy equipment. The local groups prefer not to have the information in written form for their own reasons, but their response is invariably positive and forthcoming.

There is one brief reference to cultural Issues in Westplan under Section 3.1: Response Priorities and the matter is not covered in the Dampier Plan.

All contingency plans should provide procedures and the necessary State/NT Government contacts for dealing with heritage and cultural matters when responding to pollution incidents. These procedures would also apply to the conduct of equipment deployment exercises.

## 6. Appendices

### Appendix 1 Exercise Definitions

#### **Exercise 2000 Planning Team**

This team is responsible for pre exercise planning, initiating the exercise, conducting the exercise throughout its operational phase and facilitating an exercise debrief and subsequent exercise report on completion of the exercise.

#### **Executive Response Group (ERG)**

A Western Australian Committee, chaired by the ERG Coordinator responsible for management of West-Plan Marine Oil Pollution

#### **State Marine Pollution Controller (SMPC)**

This person is a high level Government appointee who is in overall charge of the response to a major incident.

#### **State Marine Pollution Committee**

The Western Australian National Plan State Committee is to provide advice and support to the State Marine Pollution Controller and Incident Controller as well as advice to appropriate State Ministers.

#### **Incident Controller (IC)**

This individual is responsible for the management of all operations in response to an incident.

#### **Incident Control Centre (ICC)**

The location where the Incident Controller and members of the Incident Management Team provide overall direction of response activities in an incident.

#### **Incident Management Team**

A group comprising the Incident Controller and the individuals appointed to be responsible for the functions of Planning, Operations, Logistics and Finance & Administration, together with any other individual appointed by the Incident Controller from time to time.

#### **Planning Section**

The Planning Section, under the direction of the Planning Officer, is responsible for providing up-to-date and accurate information of a scientific and environmental nature to the Incident Management Team.

#### **Operations Section**

The Operations Section is headed by the Operations Officer, a member of the Incident Management Team responsible to the Incident Controller for the Section's activities in the Incident Control Centre and for all field operations.

#### **Logistics Section**

The Logistics Section is headed by the Logistics Officer, a member of the Incident Management Team responsible to the Incident Controller for the activities of the Section.

(cont)

The section is responsible for the supply of services and resources to support and sustain the operational response to an incident.

**Finance & Administration Section**

The Finance and Administration Section is headed by the Finance and Administration Officer responsible to the Incident Controller for maintaining financial and administrative records of the response activities.

**Local Emergency Management Advisory Committee (LEMAC)**

A committee assigned to develop and maintain effective emergency management arrangements for the local area.

## Appendix 2      Participants and Agencies

AMOSC  
AMSA  
Boat Club Dampier  
Bristow Helicopters  
Bureau of Meteorology  
Charter Boat Industry  
Cossack Pearling Company  
Customs  
Dal Marine  
Dampier Port Authority  
Dampier Salt  
Department of Conservation and Land Management  
Dept of Environmental Protection  
Fire & Rescue Services Authority  
Fisheries WA  
Fremantle Port Authority  
Hamersley Iron  
Helicopters Australia  
Karratha Hospital  
LEMAC members  
Lloyds Helicopters  
Mermaid Marine  
MSPMS  
Pilbara Regiment  
Port Hedland Port Authority  
Robe River Mining  
Roebourne Shire  
Shell  
Shipping Agents  
State Emergency Services  
St Johns Ambulance  
VSSRG – West Pilbara  
WA Police Service  
WA Transport (Fremantle)  
WA Transport (Karratha)  
Western Stevedores  
Woodside

## Appendix 3      Umpires and Observers

### **Umpires:**

Ray Lipscombe	(Australian Maritime Safety Authority)
Jim Huggett	(Queensland Transport)
Wayne Stuart	(Australian Maritime Safety Authority)
Gary Webb	(Newcastle Port Corporation)
Trevor Gilbert	(Australian Maritime Safety Authority)
David Gray	(Australian Maritime Safety Authority)
Chris Priestly	(Queensland Transport)
Jim Pullin	(Sydney Ports Corporation)
Bob Williams	(BP Australia, Kwinana)
Robbie Rath	(BHP Petroleum)
Andrae Luks	(Department of Premier and Cabinet, South Australia)
David Baird	(Australian Maritime Safety Authority)

### **Observers:**

Rob Service	(Maritime Safety Authority of New Zealand)
Sharon Sherman	(Department of Primary Industries, Water and Environment, Tasmania)
Bill Overton	(Department of Transport and Works, Northern Territory)
Mark Hughes	(Marine Board of Victoria)
Gary Gifford	(Regional Director Pilbara Kimberly Region Western Australian State Emergency Service)



## Appendix 4      Pertinent Information and Times

### Exercise Control Room Running Log

#### Monday 4/9/2000

- 1452 Call from Derek at Port Dampier, Ships' details not included in the attachment from Jim Pullin, Wynne Jones to fax; Ian Badham faxed the information at 1500
- 1500 Faxed ships' details from Exercise Scenario
- 1505 Exercise started; 24 people on board; 2 injuries from previous incident; vessel at anchor
- 1510 Umpires/observers en route
- 1516 Fax sent by Wynne Jones to Dampier Port Authority
- 1517 Trouble encountered calling Port Authority number
- 1520 Agents "Sea Express" contacted DPA and confirmed 5 tonnes spilled; fax with ship and cargo details sent
- 1525 "Kas Kong Spirit" no longer part of the exercise; spill still in DPA area; no outside notification at this stage
- 1530 Vessel at anchor in channel; Port querying this location and will direct it to move if necessary but leave it in the vicinity of the collision site
- 1531 Details of "el Zeit" stowage plan faxed to DPA
- 1532 David Baird/Wayne Stuart outside DoT Fremantle; no advice of notification
- 1535 No report; injected loss rate of 20 T/h to promote notification process
- 1540 Agent "el Zeit" reported breach in No 5 & 6 port not No 2 as earlier reported; loss rate confirmed at 20 T/h
- 1541 Port at this stage have no incident number and are now sorting this out
- 1545 Ship to be now shifted to 20deg34.2minS, 116deg42minE, 3cables from point of collision
- 1546 Con Sappelli advised verbally
- 1547 Wayne Stuart advised
- 1550 Ship's pilot advises oil going NNE
- 1555 Agents faxed confirmation to DPA – damage to 5P and 6P; leak at 20 T/h
- 1558 Ship being shifted to anchor by 1620

- 1600 Skipper F/V "Stella Novus" Mike Lehmann reported 3 oiled turtles about 500 m SE of Boiler Rock
- 1605 POLREP reports collision damage with A960 reduced crude involved
- 1620 Media call made; Greg Trenberth is the media spokesman
- 1622 (Delay – 'Ship's Master' kept on hold for some while) Master of "el Zeit" advised 300 tonnes now estimated to be in the Water; Master advised the ICC that the ship is at anchor
- 1640 Trevor Gilbert called; he told us the ICC is questioning oil properties and dispersability internally but so far have not made any requests for external assistance
- 1642 Question raised by Ray Lipscombe re crew leaving ship
- 1645 EC queried ICC re modelling intentions; OSTM being looked at; flagged past Ray re WX and ADIOS; Ray tied up as Pilot
- 1650 John Fewings requested formal NRT assistance from AMSA; hard copy to be sent to notify 15 key people being mobilised from interstate; AMSA is Waiting for confirmation of the extent of the problem; John asked Greg to check the application of the Biodiversity Act
- 1654 Called Wayne Stuart and informed him that John Fewings has raised concerns re the Biodiversity Act (through Ray Lipscombe)
- 1655 Mike Balsdon informed David Baird – General Manager, AMSA
- 1700 Glen Bajars, Planning Officer requested OSTM
- 1705 Helicopter report; unable to pass to Port Control; passed to Greg Trenberth
- 1710 John Fewings called AMOSC; notified incident in Port Dampier involving oil tanker; may require some assistance with equipment and requested destination of tanker (Which refinery?)
- 1718 John Fewings called AMSA re fixed wing support for dispersant; AMSA to reply when aircraft availability and ETA known
- 1725 OSTM fax sent to Planning Officer at ICC
- 1726 Media inquiries from 4 or 5 persons calling in (14 calls). 4 have gone to Fremantle and the rest to Dampier; Greg Trenberth is handling media information; a media release is to be issued from Fremantle at 1800
- 1730 John Fewings requested ADIOS information on A960 oil
- 1731 ADIOS information on A960 sent
- 1735 Greg faxed details on NRT personnel to John Fewings; information includes details of people and skills as well as travel details
- 1740 Rod Ferrantes of Pilbara Ore P/L rang for details of port operations. ICC reported no restriction to vessel operations in the Port
- 1750 IC structure faxed to MEOC from Vicki Lorantas, Finance and Administration Section

- 1755 AMSA advised John Fewings that one AMR fixed wing aircraft could be available at 1800 tomorrow, Tuesday, 5/9/2000
- 1800 "Sea Express" agents faxed DPA that vessel is covered by Tango P & I to full extent of \$US750 million. Owners also confirm that ITOPF have been asked to send a representative to Dampier
- 1803 Jim Turnmoor (Planning) rang AMSA for ADIOS information on both A960 and light Arabian
- 1805 Ship's Master rang ICC to advise that the leak has slowed down but the revised estimate of oil lost is now 800 T
- 1813 AMSA sent the ADIOS information on A960 and light Arabian crude
- 1814 Greg Beck AMSA faxed details of fixed wing aircraft arrivals to John Fewings of W A DoT. This now involves the possible arrivals of 3 aircraft
- 1820 Copy of media statement as released
- 1830 Fax sent to DPA re vessel previously named as "Pol Pot" should have been named "Kas Kong Spirit"
- 1850 Shipping Agents advise that they indemnify DPA to the extent of the vessel's cover under CLC – estimated to be \$US57.5 million. Under IOPC Australia will also make up this cover to \$210 million
- 1854 AMSA sent ADIOS information on A960 and light Arabian crude to John Fewings following his request for these details
- 1859 SITREP No 2 from Dampier Port Authority to ERG DoT, re 800 T in Water, non-deployment of booms, and impact areas estimated from OSTM. Next SITREP to be 0700 tomorrow unless the situation changes
- 1900 Fax from John Fewings to Lindsay Copeman re Fremantle response structure and details of fixed wing dispersant aircraft. Police Air Wing FWAC available also. Con Sappelli bringing dispersant kit 0600 5<sup>th</sup>
- 1925 Barbara O'Dowd requested an electronic version of OSTM to [meoc@transport.WA.gov.au](mailto:meoc@transport.WA.gov.au). AMSA told B O'D that they were trying to contact the operator of the model but had not been successful to date. They are to keep trying
- 1928 Called Greg Beck re request to talk with Trevor about supplying the electronic OSTM version directly
- 1935 Fax from John Fewings to Lindsay Copeman with questions about location of casualty, status of injured crew members, condition of ship and intention of Master re abandoning, salvor, leak details, quantity spilled, equipment deployed and locations. Also offer of further support
- 2000 Media alert re 2 media conferences on 5/9/2000. 9 am at DPA building for media on site and 10:30 am at Marine House, 1 Essex Street, Fremantle for Perth-based media
- 2004 Trevor Gilbert has sent electronic version of OSTM to John Fewings and DPA. This Was confirmed by phone that all had been received

2015 Media statement released re spill reported at 1550 today. Equipment deployment has been postponed and dispersant spraying has been placed on standby. Dampier coastline will probably be impacted

2250 Fax from ICC to Hamersley Iron to close off the power station water intake at Parker Point. Seeking confirmation that this will cause no disruption to the power supply

## **Day 2 – 5 September 2000**

0515 Frank Murphy calls DPA to get information for the 'Friends of the Pilbara' group. Receptionist explains that all the responders are in a planning meeting and someone will get back to him when the meeting is ended

0545 Guy Richards rings DPA re oil in nets. All are in a meeting. Guy will ring back in about a quarter-hour

0551 DPA requests update from "el Zeit". Ship advised that only very small leak and wanted to if there was going to be any spraying around the ship

0555 Doug Hamilton a local man reports oiled birds

0555 Greg Trenberth rang Frank Murphy back and told him that nothing was done last night but a lot has to be done today. The clean up is expected to take at least at couple of weeks. Greg left a direct number 9159 6560 for Frank to get back to him for updates

0557 DPA requested confirmation from ship re how much oil lost from tanks

0600 CALM (Fran Stanley) gets back to Doug Hamilton and they will send people out to get the birds

0603 Ship advised DPA total lost is about 800 tonnes

0604 Exercise Control rings Ray Lipscombe to focus the ICC on to oil on the water (650-700 tonnes- Max 800). No further loss based on tank soundings.

0604 Media call. DPA plan to boom vessel, skim and disperse, foreshore clean up. Oil is on the foreshore; port is open; channel not impeded; all vessels moving with caution. Media conference is timed for 0900.

0610 ICC sent complete response structure to Exercise Control

0612 Advice from DPA. Notam active for 3m from vsl to 3000 ft – 0600 to 1800. Securite messages being sent each hour

0613 Guy Richards rings again re oil on nets. Greg Trenberth tells him fishing fleet will be able to claim direct costs from the DPA. Compensation might become a matter between the fishermen and the ship. Fishing fleets had been advised of the problem on Ch 16 and Ch 11 overnight

0625 DPA fax Ray Masini to get authorisation for dispersant use

0630 Arablip Fishing Collective send fax to ICC re details of compensation arrangements on behalf of their members

- 0630 Consultant offered personal services to Greg Trenberth. Greg asked for CV to be sent
- 0630 MEOC Logistics ask for details of people coming to Karratha – numbers, names, and oil spill experience
- 0630 Details of personnel sent as requested
- 0640 John Fewings requests info from IC Lindsay Copeman re condition of ship; salvors; aerial surveys; oil samples for evidence
- 0640 SITREP No 3 from ICC includes reference to predicted impact points and boom arrangements
- 0650 Call from Ben Holyock (Planning) requesting ADIOS on both oils
- 0700 AMOSC sent the ADIOS details as requested
- 0700 Shayne Wilde (AMSA) advised of offer from EARL via AMOSC of a Hercules + equipment available ex Singapore. ETD within 2 hours of notification. ETA within 8 hours of departure
- 0700 Oil spill surveillance chart copy received
- 0718 Response from IC to John Fewings' fax of 0640
- 0729 Gary Webb told Jim Robinson that the shoreline information and diagrams were very handy
- 0729 Fax to John Fewings re EARL offer (ADDS pack and equipment in Hercules)
- 0730 Fax to DPA – informed of an application in the Supreme Court of WESTERN AUSTRALIA on behalf of commercial fisherpersons re non-spraying of dispersants
- 0750 Sitrep received from ICC
- 0802 Reply to Neil Smythe, Arablip Fishing Collective re claims for oil damage to equipment and compensation arrangements to be advised
- 0810 DPA request AMSA arrange Pt Hedland/Pt Walcott equipment
- 0830 Commodore Morrow rang DPA re cleaning fouled yacht hulls – arrangements and payments. Greg Trenberth to ring back
- 0835 AMOSC called Robe River IA on behalf of AMSA re equipment request
- 0845 Fax sent to Transport Fremantle re OSTM projection re validity until 1800 today
- 0848 Mick Dillon of Western Australia Littoral and Ornithology Society called DPA re 50 experts on hand skilled in handling Port Dampier wildlife. Fran Stanley to ring Mick back on 0427 005 699
- 0850 Greg AMSA told John Fewings the Port Hedland Robe River equipment is on the Way. Port Hedland will have some gear left in port
- 0900 SITREP received from ICC

- 0910 Peter Kendrick from the Karratha CALM office rang on behalf of Fran Stanley. His number is 9143 1488, fax 9144 1118. Vet staff at zoo have been contacted as well. Peter would appreciate 3 or 4 of the Western Australia Lit and Orn Soc to provide training to local people and will fly them to Karratha pending source and personal details
- 0910 AMSA faxed ERG re Port Walcott and Port Hedland equipment available in the Dampier region. ETA 1430 and 1030 today respectively
- 0910 Pilbara Recruitment faxed DPA re 220 people available to assist with clean up program
- 0916 Fax request for additional trained personnel for Ro-Boom deployment
- 0925 Syd from Fremantle Port Authority enquired from AMSA who pays for shipping equipment from Port Hedland/Robe River. AMSA will pay and the claim will be made on ship's insurers via WESTERN AUSTRALIA Government
- 0930 Pilbara Rotor Services fax ICC to advise aircraft available. Media have put all RWAC on standby
- 0930 Received fax from Steve Cable (logistics icc) requesting additional radios
- 0935 Media Monitors fax a report from the 0600 national news. Disastrous picture painted; possibility of this being the main items in today's State and Federal parliaments
- 0940 Nick Egan solicitor for DPA advised that his client will use dispersant and will appear at the hearing to oppose the injunction
- 0940 Return fax from John Fewings requesting toxicity data and other relevant performance characteristics to help State Committee assess the offer from Global Traders
- 0945 Fax media report to DPA. Exports shut down, badly handled response; costing the iron ore trade a fortune
- 0946 Greg Trenberth told Commodore Morrow about the decision concerning compensation for cancellation of a yacht race
- 0948 Wild Ocean Environment Trust fax offer of 35 wildlife volunteers to DPA. They will be arriving 1300 and 1730. What arrangements for accommodation and meals
- 0948 Received list of trained personnel from QDoT
- 1002 "Kas Kong Spirit" no longer part of Exercise 2000. Greg Beck told Chris Priestly
- 1002 Information on AMOSC Core Group members sent to Marine Safety, Fremantle
- 1003 Information on AMOSC Core Group members sent to Dampier Port Authority
- 1004 John Oliver spoke to Fran Stanley re fax about Wild Ocean Environment Trust. She said 35 volunteers would be welcome and will advise CALM about this. Claims for expenses will be arranged by Greg Ahearn of DPA. His direct number is 9159 6563
- 1013 AMSA Canberra is sending a new OSTM run
- 1015 Local fisherman rang ICC re closed boat ramp and tainted fish. A marine biologist will ring Henry Diekmar back about the tainted fish issue

- 1020 George Foster, visiting Research Fellow at Western Australia Uni from Maine Uni asked about post-spill research opportunities. Greg Trenberth told George that no consideration had been yet given to this aspect but that DEP would probably direct some of that work. Greg suggested George send a CV and details of the research capabilities. He told George to send details to him on Fax 9159 6557 or if they are bulky to post to Dampier Port Authority, PO Box 285, Dampier, Zip Code 6713
- 1026 Peter Kendrick of Karratha CALM rang and said they did not need the 35 people from Wild Ocean Environment Trust at this moment. There are only 20 affected birds. Peter said he would be happy for the people to remain on standby and that if needed accommodation and other arrangements would be put in place
- 1037 Exercise Control faxed IC and John Fewings that AMSA, United Salvage, and the ship's classification society had inspected the vessel and concluded is not a hazard and should remain at its present location at anchor pending cargo transfer
- 1042 Brad Groves local AMSA Surveyor confirmed to Exercise Control that "el Zeit" is stable and unlikely to break up. Leakage only small now
- 1045 Doug Marsen, local fisherman offered 20 metre fishing boat and crew to incident response. IC to ring Doug back
- 1047 Exercise Control faxed Shayne Wilde and John Fewings that EARL assistance is not required at this stage
- 1047 Fax received, sent to Harbour Masters. SITREP dialogue with request for additional trained personnel
- 1100 Fax sent to DPA re dispersant injunction being unsuccessful in Western Australia Supreme Court
- 1200 ITOPF called DPA CEO. Line busy, requested that he call back.
- 1210 Received fax from DPA Sitrep.
- 1210 Received fax- Info for Phillip Brace (ADIOS copy)
- 1215 Received fax from DPA re aircraft availability (reply)
- 1225 Received fax DPA re debrief
- 1224 Fremantle Transport faxed DPA re zoom boom ex Port Hedland confirmed but request for 3 supervisors and 18 labourers cannot be filled
- 1226 Received call from DPA for Ivor Check, reply to earlier call requesting financial details of the response. DPA advised total expenditure to date \$100K. Reserved the right to consult with legal dept. before providing additional detail.
- 1230 ITOPF called DPA and requested financial details of the response. DPA advised total expenditure to date = \$100,000. Reserved the right to consult with legal department before providing additional detail
- 1303 Local councillor phoned ICC re local tip not suitable for oily waste

- 1317 Media statement of 1200 today received re use of dispersants and deflector booms. The injunction of the Western Australia CFGuild rejected by Full Bench of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. 20 oiled birds collected from Courtney Shoal. Wildlife cleaning centre set up at Dampier AIMS
- 1320 Wynne Jones calls John Fewings as Minister's Press Secretary
- 1323 Copy of Mermaid Sound surface current data received at Exercise Control as sent to MEOC in Perth
- 1330 Called Chair of Executive Response Group with questions from the Premier
- 1335 Fax from R Flugge to P Brace Woodside confirming waste oil has not been mixed with dispersant. First receipt of waste expected at 1700 today
- 1336 SITREP of 1300 today quite detailed as to response actions in place and planned
- 1350 Peter Starkey legal rep for local indigenous people questions Greg Trenberth re contact about response operations
- 1350 Greg Beck informs John Fewings that the local indigenous people have not had any satisfactory answers about what is happening around or near significant sites
- 1358 John Fewings faxed IC re Harbour Masters and equipment available including a number of people for Supervisor and Incident Controller duty
- 1419 John Fewings rang and told us that Port Hedland Aboriginal Affairs had two representatives representing the traditional owners intending to visit Dampier. They were disturbed that an exercise would be held on the peninsula without notification
- 1420 Fax of new Incident Control structure received
- 1430 Injunction to cease oil spill response activity under Commonwealth Environment and Biodiversity Conversation Act 1999 (Section 475)
- 1445 Estelle Blackburn (9239 2440) Community Relations – Fremantle rang to encourage solicitor Peter Starkey to arrange a meeting between the Weejunbunda people and the Dampier Port Authority as soon as possible
- 1500 Greg Beck spoke to Wayne Stuart. Mr Starkey not accurately representing views of local indigenous people and no further contact to be made with him. John Fewings advised to send advice to Exercise Control with information to placate indigenous people
- 1520 John Fewings faxes Chairperson Weejunbunda people acknowledging their concerns re sacred sites. He states he has requested responders to respect their concerns and looks forward to working with the Weejunbunda in the future to ensure their heritage is respected
- 1540 Notice that Exercise will be terminated at 1600 sent to DPA and ERG
- 1558 SITREP No 7 received. Advising current situation re zoom boom and Sea Sweep. Also planned actions for the immediate future. Monitor overnight; intention to arrange labour for intensive shoreline operations in next few days
- 1600 Exercise ends



## Appendix 5 Photographs

The following photos were taken and supplied by AMSA

### Mermaid Sound - Port Dampier W.A.



### Dampier Port Authority Building



## Helicopter Spray Bucket Unit



## Planning Section



# RAN Hydrographic Chart of Port of Dampier



# Incident Control Centre



## State Board - Operations

WEATHER: TIME 15:45 DATE 09/06/00				TIDES SUNRISE SUNSET		INCIDENT DETAILS				IMT MEETING	
WIND SPEED	5-12	DIRN	S/SW	DATE	/ /	TIME	:	INCIDENT	Ex 2000	REF NO.	NEXT
TEMP MAX	30	MIN		CURRENT CONDITIONS				DATE	09-06-00	TIME 15:45 (24hrs)	hrs
WAVES HT.		PERIOD		HIGHS	2.97 m	2.30 hrs	LOWS	2.03 m	1.48 hrs	NAME OF VESSEL / FACILITY	"EL ZEIT"
CURRENT SPEED		DIRN		SUNRISE	0615	hrs	SUNSET	1806	hrs	LOCATION OF VESSEL / FACILITY	
WATER TEMP	22 °C							VOLUME OF OIL SPILLED		GEOGRAPHIC	Just North S2
24 HOUR FORECAST				TOMORROWS CONDITIONS				TOTAL		5 t. (20t per hour)	
WIND SPEED	U → PMS	DIRN	SE / SW	HIGHS	3.24 m	0643 hrs	LOWS	2.30 m	0920 hrs	EST WEATHERING	
TEMP MAX		MIN						ON SHORE			
WAVES HT.		PERIOD		SUNRISE	0614	hrs	SUNSET	1807	hrs	AT SEA	
CURRENT SPEED		DIRN						VOLUME OF OIL REMAINING @ RISK OF BEING SPILLED		6500 t.	
WATER TEMP	°C							SOURCE		N65456B TANK	
FORECAST : HOURS								STATUS CONTROLLED			
WIND SPEED		DIRN						SHORELINES IMPACTED			
TEMP MAX		MIN									
WAVES HT.		PERIOD									
CURRENT SPEED		DIRN									
WATER TEMP	°C										

## Dampier Port Authority - Port Control Centre



## Appendix 6

### EXERCISE 2000

#### SCENARIO

##### Introduction:

The Maltese Registered Panamax Crude Oil Carrier the motor vessel "el Zeit" on Charter to oil interests and is bound from the Gulf to Japan with a cargo of Light Arabian Crude and A960 reduced Crude, via the Straits of Mallacca, when it is diverted to an Australian refinery. The Master opts to use the route via the Sunda Straits, to make his passage across the Indian Ocean to Australia.

Whilst on passage the ships fourth engineer and a greaser sustain severe spinal injuries, due to an engine room accident. The Master receives medical advice that medevac by helicopter to a shore based hospital is not an option due to the nature of the injuries. The Master sets course at all speed to the nearest port, Dampier with the intention of transferring the casualties under qualified medical supervision to a smaller vessel at Pilot Dampier. The ship advised its ETA Pilot Dampier as 1330, Monday 4 September 2000. Due to unavailability of suitable craft and a number of other factors the planned transfer is unable to take place. The "el Zeit" has now been given permission to enter the port to carry out the transfer in Mermaid Strait.


At this time within the port of Dampier the Kamarian registered general cargo vessel m.v. "Kas Kong Spirit", had discharged a cargo of machinery parts. The ship is presently detained at the Dampier public wharf after AMSA had identified extensive deficiencies with the vessel. The ship has been detained for several days and the Master is under pressure from the owners to sail the ship. The ship is also suspected to have letters of credit problems. Having monitored VHF traffic from "el Zeit" the Master of the "Kas Kong Spirit" decides to make a break for sea whilst the "el Zeit" is in the channel, reasoning all port services will be focussed on "el Zeit".


Successfully clearing the public wharf the "Kas Kong Spirit", proceeds at speed down the channel, the Master refusing to acknowledge repeated calls from Harbour Control to put about and keep out of the way of "el Zeit". At 1500 hrs as the vessel is about to pass the "el Zeit" the steering gear (one of the items of deficiency) fails, the rudder jamming hard over to port. In an attempt to counter the vessel's swing the Master puts the main engine full astern but is unable to prevent an impact between "el Zeit" and "Kas Kong Spirit". The collision took place approximately halfway between Number 4 and 5 beacons. As a result of the impact the tankers port side shell plating and the transverse bulkhead failed approximately three metres from deck edge. The "Kas Kong Spirit", suffered some minor damage in way of stem plating and is losing water from the fore peak, The "Kas Kong Spirit" backed out of the damaged section of the tanker and is observed to come to anchor clear of the channel.

The pilot of "el Zeit" orders the vessel to anchor on a bearing of 010, ½ a nautical mile from No 5W beacon. Concerned with the risk of fire he directs the attending tugs to lay a pattern of foam on the deck in way of the damage. He also notifies harbour control that it appears that a quantity of crude is pouring into the channel from the damaged tanks.

Appendix 7

Port of Dampier





## Ship Particulars

### Incident vessel No.1

**Name:** mv "el Zeit" ex " Ho Yao" ex "Hormuz Maru"  
**Flag:** Orangeland  
**Port of Registry:** Faith City  
**Year Built:** 1973 Hakodate Japan  
**Owner:** Dawn Enterprises  
**Reg Office:** Pan Arabic Tanker Management  
52 Brave St  
SINGAPORE

**LOA:** 225 Metres  
**Beam:** 35 Metres  
**Summer Draft** 12 Metres  
**Summer D'wt.** 62,360 Metric Tonnes  
**GRT** 78000  
**NRT** 5260  
**West Australian Agents:** (Exercise Control)  
**P&I Insurers:** Britannic

### Incident Vessel 2

**Name:** mv "Kas Kong Spirit" ex "Arctic Pathfinder" ex "Ice Princess"  
**Flag:** Kamarian  
**Port of Registry:** Port Kamaria  
**Year Built:** 1962 Copenhagen, Denmark  
**Owner:** Phong Mei Shipping  
**Reg Office:** 9 Vin Tut Square  
Port Kamaria  
KAMARIA

**LOA:** 135 Metres  
**Beam:** 16.2 Metres  
**Summer Draft** 9.2 Metres  
**Summer D'wt.** 8398 Metric Tonnes  
**GRT** 4848  
**NRT** 1936  
**West Australian Agents:** (Exercise Control)  
**P&I Insurers:** Not Known



## Appendix 8 Oil Spill Response Incident Control System Organisation

